
Raising & Investing an SBIC Fund

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Overview of Renovus Capital

- SBIC Fund founded in January 2010
 - Received Greenlight in September 2010
 - Licensed in August 2011

- \$170 million debentures fund with 2x leverage
 - Raised \$56 million of private capital
 - \$5 million GP commitment
 - \$13.5 million in capital from institutional investors (e.g., Prudential, TD Bank)
 - Balance raised from wealthy individuals / small family offices

- Focused on investing in the education and training sector
 - Founders had been a deal team together at Leeds Equity, a \$500 million buyout fund focused on education and training

- Primarily do small buyouts of businesses with \$2-\$5 million of EBITDA
 - Interested in growing but profitable companies
 - Buying primarily from founders
 - Closed three buyouts in 2012

Overview of Fundraising Environment

- Recent years have been the worst fundraising environment ever for private equity
 - Individual investors are focused on liquidity and current yield
 - Banks have been scared out of the market due to losses and new regulations
 - Family offices are more focused on fees and are looking to in-source
 - Institutional investors are shrinking allocations and number of relationships

- There is an institutional investor bias against SBIC funds
 - SBIC funds seen as “bush-league”
 - Management fees seen as 6% rather than 2%
 - SBIC funds too small for many investors

- Nonetheless, capital can still be found by a good team with a good strategy
 - SBIC’s 2:1 matching more than outweighs the negatives
 - A lot of \$100-150MM SBIC funds are being raised

- World is starting to change
 - More institutions are looking at SBIC funds
 - The banks are getting back into the market
 - Structure is appealing to individual investors

Potential LP Categories

- Individual Investors
 - Pros: Quick to decide, rarely ask for special deals, lots of them out there
 - Cons: Typically \$500K-\$1MM, often can't scale for later funds
 - How to Find Them: Network (rich people know rich people)

- Banks
 - Pros: Attracted by CRA credit; can do \$3-5MM
 - Cons: Conservative investors; still scared of new regulatory environment
 - Most Active: TD, Wells Fargo, Cole Taylor, Harris Bank, Capital One

- Traditional Institutional Investors (Pensions, Endowments, etc.)
 - Pros: Can easily do \$10-\$50MM
 - Cons: Concentration limits and minimums, little experience with SBICs, slow to make decisions
 - How to Find Them: SBIA, Preqin, agents

- Fund of Funds / Family Offices
 - Pros: Starting to look at SBICs; can do \$5-\$20MM, concentration limits and minimum are not as big a problem
 - Cons: Many lack capital; fee adverse; looking to do deals rather than funds; may want a special deal

Fundraising & The SBIC Process

- Important to coordinate the SBIC licensing process with fundraising
 - Need to make parallel progress on both to be successful
- SBA takes fundraising progress into account when awarding the Greenlight letter and prioritizing your license application
 - Minimum commitment needed for licensure has trended up from \$15MM to \$30MM
 - Need to have a hard close and call capital before getting final approval
- Potential investors similarly focused on SBIC licensure progress
 - Banks and institutional investors will generally not take a real look at an unlicensed fund
- Focus on individual investors as a starting point
 - More willing to commit to an unlicensed fund
 - Can provide the critical mass to get through licensure
- Understand the SBIC rules regarding fees
 - First close starts the 5-year clock on being able to collect full fees
 - You cannot collect back fees for investors who come in after the first close so these fees are lost

The SBIC Pitch

- Small businesses are the best place to invest private equity
 - Large number of potential targets
 - Increasingly underserved by traditional private equity funds and other sources of capital
 - Lower valuations
 - Best growth prospects
 - Greatest ability for investors to add value

- SBIC structure enhances LP returns
 - Government only gets ~4% return on its money
 - All other profits accrue to the private investors
 - Turns a 2x fund into a 3.5x fund

- Terms on the SBIC debt are highly attractive
 - Fixed rate
 - 10-year term
 - No covenants other than solvency and making interest payments

- Debentures program is highly stable
 - Created in 1958
 - Has made money for the government
 - Strong bi-partisan support

How to Answer the Tough Questions

- Am I really paying a 6% management fee?
 - Charging 2% on the capital being invested
 - Have 3x the capital to generate enough profit to pay 3x the fees
 - This cost embedded in third-party debt

- Doesn't cross-collateralization create a lot more risk for the private investors?
 - Cross-collateralization cuts both ways
 - In a balanced portfolio, good companies can subsidize one or two struggling investments through a dip
 - Key is to avoid wipeouts by focusing on low-beta investments

- Isn't this just financial engineering masquerading as good investing?
 - All LBOs are financial engineering
 - SBIC structure uses financial engineering to reduce dependence on growth to generate returns
 - Growth is hard to find in the current economic environment

- If you're such a good team why are you an SBIC?
 - SBIC structure offers real benefits in a low-growth environment
 - There is virtually no path for a first-time fund to raise meaningful capital outside of the SBIC program

What Makes a Good SBIC Deal

- Limited downside risk
 - Cross-collateralization makes avoiding wipeouts a top priority
 - Avoid highly cyclical businesses and those with fragile business models
 - Turnarounds and startups are not a fit except as perhaps the last deal or two in a fund

- Conservative valuations
 - 2/3rds of your investment is debt that needs to be serviced
 - Anything above ~6-7x results in too much leverage

- Strong free cash flow
 - With no outside leverage, free cash flow can be distributed to the fund
 - Services SBIC debt and offsets capital calls from LPs
 - Significantly enhances IRRs since effectively providing dividends to 30%-cost equity rather than paying down 4%-cost debt
 - Helps address concentration limit by providing internally-generated growth capital

- Modest growth potential
 - Flipside of limited downside and conservative valuation
 - With SBIC structure, 5% growth produces very attractive returns to private LPs
 - Concentration limit makes aggressive, capital-intensive growth strategies difficult to execute (e.g., rollups)

Avoiding Insolvency

- Insolvency is the biggest risk in the SBIC program
 - Very hard to miss an interest payment on debt that costs 4%
 - Much easier to lose 40% of private capital with 2:1 leverage and 6% fees

- Understand the SBIC valuation guidelines
 - Not the same as FASB 157
 - Write downs are handled like FASB 157
 - Write ups are limited to third-party transactions (e.g., a follow-on financing) and actual cash exits
 - Management fees, organizational costs and broken deal expenses all count towards 40% test

- Avoid early losses at all costs
 - Inability to write up current portfolio really limits ability to offset losses in a fund's early years

- Generate current income
 - Builds up cushion against losses
 - Deal and monitoring fees can supplement interest income

- Negotiate good discounts with vendors on broken deals

Explaining the SBIC Program to Management Teams

- Faster and more certain path to closing a deal
 - No financing out
 - No need to identify a lender and negotiate a credit agreement
 - Single party doing all the diligence and making all the decisions
 - Provides real differentiation in competitive processes

- More modest and achievable growth targets
 - SBIC structure generates much better returns than what a traditional fund can achieve with third-party leverage
 - 30% returns at 5-7% growth vs. 15% growth for traditional private equity funds
 - Less pressure on management to take big risks

- Much looser covenants going forward
 - Debt at 4% vs. debt at 10%
 - No performance covenants like Fixed Charge that one bad quarter can easily trip

- Attractive co-investment
 - Can offer management mix of debt and equity securities
 - Provides for immediate current yield